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"I'LL GIVE YOU SHELTER FROM THE
STORM": PRIVILEGE, CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND CONFESSIONS OF CRIME
Michael L. Perlin*
I. PROLOGUE
I shared this hypothetical with several therapists. To a person,
they had the same response, paraphrasing only slightly: "Are you
kidding? Of course, she's gonna inform the authorities. This privilege
stuff is so gray anyway, she'd never get in trouble if it looked like she
was trying to save the life of an innocent guy."' So...
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Introduction
It seems to me that there are a few overarching factual questions
that must be considered before we move on to the legal issues of
privilege law: Did Jones really do it? Was this a true confession or
a false confession? Was Jones motivated by a "compulsion to con-
fess"? Should/can/must the psychiatrist assume that the patient is
telling "the truth"?
B. The "Confession"
Jones told Dr. Palmer what was apparently a convincing story of
his culpability in the bank killing. It is not clear from the hypothetical
whether Jones shared any information with Palmer that Jones could
not have learned from reading press accounts of the crime or from
street talk-say, from other ex-inmates to whom Smith may have told
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University, 1966; J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1969.
1. One therapist added: "There are probably a couple of psychoanalysts on the
Upper East Side [of New York City] who'd say they wouldn't divulge this information, but
those guys would never treat a street criminal in the first place, so that shouldn't count."
Although the therapists uniformly spoke -of "privilege," the issue from this
perspective, of course, is one of confidentiality.
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details of his story. There is, of course, no reason to assume that Dr.
Palmer followed reports of the murder case in the media during the
trial. So if Jones told her factually impossible information-saying,
for example, "I shot him with a revolver," in spite of the fact that
ballistics evidence had confirmed that the murder weapon was a
sawed-off shotgun-she would not necessarily have any way of
knowing or being able to identify the contents of such an error.
"False confessions" are not simply a staple of TV movies; they
are real. As many as 740 erroneous convictions each year may be due
to false confessions,2 and a 1973 British study found false confessions
the second leading reason for such convictions?
A significant number of these confessions are spontaneous and
often arise in high publicity cases. 4 Some are inspired by a desire to
protect a friend or peer from prosecution.' Others confess because
of a "'morbid desire for notoriety,'" an "'unconscious need to
expiate guilt over previous transgressions via self-punishment,'" or an
inability to "distinguish fact from fantasy., 6 The majority of false
confessors are "unusually psychologically vulnerable,"7 and many
suffer from mental disorders that "might substantially impair [their]
2. This inference is based on two separate studies. A 1987 study concluded that 49
of 350 wrongful convictions studied resulted from coerced or other false confessions.
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 57 (1987). A 1986 study estimated that there are over 5700
wrongful convictions each year. C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent:
Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518, 523 (1986).
3. Laura Hoffman Ropp6, Comment, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed
To Use Trickery and Deception To Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L, REV. 729, 754
n.117 (1994) (reporting on findings in RUTH BRANDON & CHRISTIE DAVIES, WRONGFUL
IMPRISONMENT 47 (1973)); see also United States v. Koslosky, ACM 30865, 1995 WL
580889, at *2-*3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1995) (reviewing expert testimony in three
false confession studies).
4. Koslosky, 1995 WL 580889, at *2. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Criminal
Confessions and the Mentally Disabled: Colorado v. Connelly and the Future of Free Will,
in 5 CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW: CRIMINAL COURT
CONSULTATIONS 157 (Richard Rosner & Ronnie Harmon eds., 1989) (discussing spon-
taneous nature of confession, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), and its
relationship to both the defendant's mental disability and the Supreme Court's ultimate
decision to reject defendant's Miranda argument).
5. Ropp6, supra note 3, at 755 n.119 (reporting on findings in Gisli Gudjonsson, The
Psychology of False Confessions, 142 NEW L.J. 1277 (1992)).
6. I. at 754 (quoting Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession
Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 76-77 (Saul Kassin
& Lawrence Wrightsman eds., 1985)).
7. Id. at 756.
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ability to make a rational decision."8  Other studies trace the
connection between factors of personality, self-concept, and intelli-
gence in persons who admit to crimes they did not commit.9
The extent of Jones's mental illness or disorder is unknown; we
are simply told that he received psychiatric counseling in prison and
was referred to Dr. Palmer for continuing treatment. If his mental
disorder is severe," therefore placing Jones at somewhat higher risk
for being a false confessor, it certainly should be within Dr. Palmer's
clinical expertise to assess the likelihood of whether his confession is
true. This is a factual threshold determination that must be made
before any of the legal issues can be meaningfully addressed.
C A Cusp Issue: Jones's Relationship to Palmer
The fact pattern is ambiguous as to whether Jones's therapy
sessions are a condition of parole or whether he was simply referred
to Dr. Palmer by a prison social service worker at the time of his
release." As I have already stated, my hunch is that seeing Dr.
Palmer is a parole condition. If that is so, it raises another question:
Does this fact sufficiently alter the patient-psychiatrist relationship so
as to affect the ultimate resolution of this case?
Courts have generally held that the requirement to participate in
counseling is a valid condition of parole" or probation, 3 although
8. Ua (reporting on findings in Gudjonsson, supra note 5, at 1278); see also Carol
Woods Frazier, Note, Corroboration of Confessions in the Theft by Receiving Context: Is
Proof of Theft Enough?, 44 ARK. L. REV. 805, 812-13 (1991) (reporting on findings in
Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde in the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 638, 644 (1954-55)).
9. See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Interrogative Suggestibility: Comparison Between
"False Confessors" and "Deniers" in Criminal Trials, 24 MED. Sci. & L. 56 (1984). See
generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 16.13, at 241 n.328 (1989 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW)
(listing recent articles on false confessions).
10. It is not clear whether Jones is a parolee or whether he was simply released from
prison after "maxing out," and subsequently referred-on a strictly voluntary basis-to Dr.
Palmer. The fact that Jones was referred to a psychiatrist-rather than to a nonphysician
mental health professional-suggests that some kind of psychotropic or antipsychotic
medication has been prescribed for him. If that is so, my intuitive hunch is that (1) Jones
is a parolee-to give the Department of Corrections some sort of "hold" on him and to
give them the authority to order him into a post-release treatment program-and (2)
Jones's disorder is thus likely to be of some degree of severity.
'11. See supra note 10.
12. McDonald v. Malone, No. 86-6146, 1987 WL 35911, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 1987)
(unpublished disposition); Steinberg v. Police Court, 610 F.2d 449, 449 (6th Cir. 1979); see
also Johnson v. Hyman, No. CIV.A.92-0606(RCL), 1993 WL 62163 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,1993)
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at least one court has held that parolees have the right to refuse
antipsychotic drug treatment-not an apparent issue in the present
hypothetical. 4 Thus, if Jones did not attend his regularly scheduled
therapy sessions, it is likely that he would be in danger of having his
parole revoked and subsequently reinstitutionalized.'5 This scenario
raises a series of related questions: Does Dr. Palmer become a
"double agent" for purposes of Jones's confession? 6 Does the Fifth
Amendment attach here?" Is it necessary for us to consider the
potential existence of a "power imbalance" between Jones and Palmer
in analyzing this problem? 8
In addition we must ask: Does Dr. Palmer have "dual loyal-
ties"? 19 What is her relationship to the Department of Corrections
(DOC) or the Parole Board (PB)? When she began therapy with
Jones, what promises-if any-did she make of confidentiality? If she
is an agent of either the DOC or PB, did she ever reveal that
information to Jones? If she did, did they ever discuss the contours
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss in factually-similar case); Murgerson v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 579 A.2d 1335 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (imposing
special parole conditions mandating participation in outpatient therapy program not
subject to judicial review absent allegation of violation of constitutional rights); cf.
Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review v. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917 (Md. 1993) (reversing parole
revocation following failure to adhere to oral conditions set out by therapist, where
defendant had not been made aware of parole conditions until time of revocation), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 284 (1993).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Stine, 521 F. Supp. 808, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1981); State v.
Emery, 593 A.2d 77, 78-80 (Vt. 1991). See generally Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me
Liberty or Give Me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for
Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 700-02 (1994) (stating that
completion of rehabilitative therapy program is a common condition of probation).
14. Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484, 1493-95 (7th Cir. 1992) (construing Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1992)). See generally PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW,
supra note 9, § 5.65A, at 99 n.1088.60 (Supp. 1995) (discussing Felce in this context).
15. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3057 (West 1982); IOwA CODE ANN. § 908.9 (West
1994).
16. See, e.g., Seymour L. Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychiatry: A
Utilitarian Approach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 279,279 (1984).
17. See, e g., Kathy Faulkner Yates, Therapeutic Issues Associated with Confidentiality
and Informed Consent in Forensic Evaluations, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 345 (1994).
18. Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Power Imbalances].
19. Jerome J. Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 A.B.A. J.
1521, 1521 (1974).
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of that relationship, or how it would affect any of Jones's confidential-
ity expectations?'
Without answers to these questions, it is impossible to fully solve
the hypothetical.
D. The Scope of the Privilege
There is no question that some sort of patient-therapist privilege
exists. Jones and Dr. Palmer had a preexisting relationship; the
disclosure was made in the context of an ongoing treatment relation-
ship; and it can be fairly assumed that, at some point in the develop-
ment and growth of that relationship, Dr. Palmer reasonably assured
Jones that they were embarking upon a privileged relationship2 1 -an
assurance to which Jones was clearly entitled.2 The hard question,
of course, is whether the disclosure falls within any statutory or
common-law exception to confidentiality.
There are three standard exceptions to the expectation of
confidentiality-' where the patient puts his mental state at issue in
other litigation;24 where a conflict exists between confidentiality and
a police-power statute; and where there exists a judicially or
20. The mere fact that the Jones-Palmer relationship might not mimic the "pure"
dyadic patient-therapist relationship does not mean that there are no expectations of
confidentiality. See Perlin, Power Imbalances, supra note 18, at 115; see also Paul S.
Appelbaum, Confidentiality in the Forensic Evaluation, 7 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 285,
288-90 (1984) (discussing the level of confidentiality due a patient after a forensic
evaluation).
21. For a comprehensive discussion of all pertinent issues, see State v. Miller, 709 P.2d
225, 231-36 (Or. 1985).
22. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, reprinted in WHO IS THE CLIENT? THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INTERVENTION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 5 (John Monahan ed., 1980).
23. See generally PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 9, § 12.37, at 106
n.655 (listing the three usual exceptions to confidentiality).
24. See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 84 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
25. See, eg., McKay v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 910 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)
(involving confidentiality and competency to operate a motor vehicle); Commonwealth ex
TeL Platt v. Platt, 404 A.2d 410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (involving confidentiality and
involuntary civil commitment law). On therapists' obligations in the case of child abuse
reporting statutes, see Elizabeth Anderson et al., Coercive Uses of Mandatory Reporting
in Therapeutic Relationships, 11 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 335 (1993); Murray Levine, A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by
Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711 (1993); Murray Levine & Eric Doherty,
Professional Issues: The Fifth Amendment and Therapeutic Requirements to Admit Abuse,
18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 98 (1991). On reporting obligations in cases of persons with
AIDS, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY § 3.19, at 476 n.28 (1994)
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legislatively imposed duty to warn a third party of an individual's
foreseeable danger.26 Assuming that there is no statutory exception
mandating a confidentiality override in the jurisdiction where the
hypothetical is set,27 and no question as to Jones's involvement in
"other litigation," the question remains whether the so-called Tarasoff
exception applies here.' In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California, the California Supreme Court held that in certain limited
circumstances, when a therapist determines-or should have deter-
mined-that her patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, she incurs a duty to use "reasonable care to protect the
intended victim."'29 If she fails to do this, she may be liable for tort
damages.30
In its second decision in the case, the supreme court found that
a "duty to protect," rather than a "duty to warn" exists
[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
[hereinafter PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY] (collecting sources); Stephen B.
Bisbing, Psychiatric Patients and AIDS: Evolving Law and Liability, 18 PSYCHIATRIC
ANNALS 582 (1988) (identifying potential areas of liability for psychiatrist); Howard
Zonana, The AIDS Patient on the Psychiatric Unit: Ethical and Legal Issues, 18
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 587 (1988) (discussing whether all psychiatric patients should be
screened for HIV and whether this information should be passed on to other patients).
26. See, eg., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
27. On the scope of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504, the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, and its parallel exceptions, see Brian Domb, Note, I Shot the
Sheriff, But Only My Analyst Knows: Shrinking the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 5 J.L.
& HEALTH 209 (1991).
28. See PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY, supra note 25, § 3.19; PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 9, §§ 13.05-.21; Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the
Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 29 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Tarasofl.
29. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The facts of
Tarasoff are well known. Poddar, a University of California graduate student, told his
therapist that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff, a young woman whom he had
previously dated. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. The therapist consulted
ith his supervisor and then contacted the campus police who questioned Poddar and
released him once he'promised to stay away from Ms. Tarasoff. Id. Two months later,
Poddar went to Ms. Tarasoff's home and killed her. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 19. Subsequently, her parents filed suit on a variety of tort theories, including the
failure of Poddar's therapists to warn Ms. Tarasoff's parents that Poddar was a "grave
danger" to their daughter. Id. at 432-33, 551 P.2d at 340-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
30. See id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may
require the therapist to take one or more of various steps,
depending upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for
him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.
31
In answering the question of whether a plaintiff would be entitled
to legal protection against a defendant's conduct in such a case, the
supreme court sought to balance the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that she would suffer injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury, the moral blameworthiness attached to the defen-
dant's conduct, and the potential consequences to the community.
32
In such cases, liability will only lie when the defendant bears a
"special relation" to the dangerous person.3 3 The therapist-patient
relationship satisfies this test.34
The supreme court rejected the argument that the mental health
professionals' inability to accurately predict dangerousness should
insulate them from liability3 and stressed that the alleged failure
here was not in the accuracy of prediction, but in the failure to warn
once the prediction was made.3 6 While it is possible that unneces-
sary warnings might be given, that risk is "a reasonable price to pay
for the lives of possible victims that may be saved., 37 Finally, the
court rejected defendant's argument that confidentiality concerns
barred the issuance of warnings. 38 Looking both at the patient's
right to privacy and the public's interest in safety, the court concluded
that "the public policy favoring protection of the confidential
character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the
31. Id at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
32. let at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
33. Id. at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 315 (1965).
34. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
35. Id. at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25.
36. 1l at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
37. 1& at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
38. Id at 440-42, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
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extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others."39
The "protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."4
How does the hypothetical fit within the Tarasoff criteria?
Although Jones does not pose a "serious danger of violence" to
Smith, if Dr. Palmer does not divulge Jones's confession, Smith is
likely to be executed by the state. The foreseeability of harm to
Smith-who becomes the "virtual plaintiff" for these purposes-is
clear. The degree of certainty that he will be executed and the
closeness of connection between Palmer's conduct-if she chooses not
to notify the authorities-and Smith's injury, the execution, is
near-absolute. Predictability of dangerousness is not an issue here;
the legally sanctioned execution is scheduled to take place. And this
appears to be almost a textbook example of a case where "disclosure
is essential to avert danger to others."41
Clearly, the hypothetical differs from the standard Tarasoff fact
pattern in at least one significant way. Jones has not threatened
direct harm to. Smith. Tarasoff, of course, focuses on harm that would
be caused directly by the patient's violent actions. Nothing in
Tarasoff or its progeny42 appears to contemplate the fact pattern
presented here. Yet, if Tarasoff stands for the proposition that the
notion of "absolute confidentiality" must yield to certain other social
values, a persuasive argument can be made that the exception should
be extended to these facts.43
39. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Domb, supra note 27, at 236 (writing about the first Menendez trial
where the testimony in question was by the defendants' psychotherapist, Domb notes "[i]t
is not unreasonable to assert that homicide, where the only evidence available relating to
the actual crime might be a psychotherapist's testimony, is an example of a compelling
area warranting the sacrifice of confidentiality").
42. See Perlin, Tarasoff, supra note 28, at 33-35 n.28 (discussing subsequent cases).
43. Certainly, the concern stated by the first wave of Tarasoff commentators-that
Tarasoff would have a chilling effect on patients' willingness to speak freely in therapy ses-
sions--did not foresee the factual situation set out in this hypothetical as a likely source
of post-Tarasoff litigation. Compare Domb, supra note 27, at 226 (reporting on findings
in Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examina-
tion of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 920 (1982) (stating that
the most prominent reason for withholding information by patients was not status of
privilege but fear of therapist's personal judgment)) with PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL
DISABILITY, supra note 25, § 3.19, at 479 (quoting commentators predicting that the
Tarasoff decision "would reduce the success of therapy by decreasing patients' trust in
their therapist, by discouraging patients from communicating sensitive information because
of fear of subsequent disclosure").
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III. CONCLUSION
My title comes from Bob Dylan's compelling song, Shelter from
the Storm." Verse six suggests the ambiguity of the problem set out
in this hypothetical:
Now there's a wall between us, somethin' there's been lost
I took too much for granted, got my signals crossed.
Just to think that it all began on a long-forgotten mom.
"Come in," she said,
"Ill give you shelter from the storm"'
Yet, if we assume two facts not in evidence-that Jones actually was
the perpetrator of the murder and that nothing in Jones's interaction
with Dr. Palmer significantly altered their therapeutic relation-
ship 46-- we are left with the Tarasoff question: Is there a "public
peril" if an individual is executed for a crime he did not commit? For
me this is an easy question. A public peril exists and Dr. Palmer
should take whatever steps she can to "protect" Smith from being
executed for a crime he did not commit. The price of avoiding a
potential future "wall" between Jones and Dr. Palmer is too great.
The fact that Jones may have "got [his] signals crossed" pales in
significance. Dr. Palmer, in this case, should attempt to give Smith,
the death row inmate, "shelter from the storm."
IV. EPILOGUE
I also shared this hypothetical with several veteran defense
counsel. Each one offered this response, again, paraphrasing only
slightly: "What difference does it make if the psychiatrist dimes the
actual perp? Do you think anyone cares? There's not a court in this
country in 1996 that would stop the execution based on this evidence.
Give it up."
44. BOB DYLAN, Shelter From the Storm, on BLOOD ON THE TRACKS (Columbia
Records 1974).
45. IL
46. See supra part II.B-C.
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